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Tajikistan’s economy has recovered strongly after the 
collapse of the 1990s, but sustaining rapid economic 
growth over the long term and reducing poverty present 
major challenges for policymakers. This paper contributes 
to the debate over the strategic role for fiscal policy to 
play in meeting these challenges, utilizing the “fiscal 
space” approach to assess the long-term potential for 
expanding public provision of growth-promoting goods 
and services and evaluating the priorities for public 
spending. It also analyzes the long-term risks to fiscal 
sustainability, from external public debt and the quasi 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network of Europe and Central 
Asia (ECA) Region—is part of a larger effort in the department to promote policy dialogue based on analytical work. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at scanagarajah@worldbank.org.  
fiscal deficit of the electricity sector. The paper contends 
that institutional reforms in key areas, notably public 
financial management, tax administration, and the 
energy sector, are crucial for generating fiscal space and 
for ensuring that higher levels of public spending are 
translated into stronger economic growth and poverty 
reduction. The priorities for government spending should 
be education, health, and the maintenance of the core 
networks of the existing infrastructure for energy and 
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This paper analyzes how fiscal policy can best contribute to sustainable long-term 
economic growth and poverty reduction in Tajikistan, a low-income economy which 
has only partially recovered from a severe economic collapse after the break-up of the 
Soviet Union in 1991. Per capita incomes in Tajikistan are the equivalent of only 
$350 per annum, the incidence of poverty is estimated at 64% and a third of children 
suffer from chronic malnutrition. The provision of basic social services, such as 
education and health care, has deteriorated dramatically because of the contraction of 
budgetary resources available to fund them. To eradicate mass poverty it will be 
necessary to maintain high rates of economic growth, with the benefits equitably 
distributed, and to rebuild basic public services. Although Tajikistan has recorded 
high rates of real GDP growth in the 2000s (averaging almost 9%), it is unlikely that 
these can be sustained over the long term without a strong rise in private investment 
and an improvement in labor productivity.  
  
The main arguments of the paper are that fiscal policy should focus on halting the 
deterioration of human capital, by allocating greater resources to recurrent 
expenditures in the education and health sectors, while at the same time ensuring that 
macroeconomic stability is not jeopardized by higher domestic borrowing or that 
fiscal sustainability is not threatened by excessive external borrowing for capital 
projects. Government expenditures on infrastructure should be focused on providing 
adequate maintenance for the core components of the existing infrastructure, rather 
than on new capital investments. Although there is some scope for improving public 
services by increasing the efficiency of government expenditures, creating sufficient 
fiscal space for all of the priority expenditures will require an expansion of budgetary 
resources. Strengthening tax administration offers the most feasible route to enhance 
budgetary resources without undermining macroeconomic stability or debt 
sustainability. While increasing expenditures in key social sectors should be a 
priority, at least as important is improving the allocation of public expenditures and 
strengthening all aspects of public financial management (PFM). The paper also 
highlights the need to tackle threats to fiscal sustainability from the huge quasi fiscal 
deficits in the energy sector. 
 
  2The approach adopted in this paper is to first review the recent performance of the 
economy and of fiscal policy (section 2). The paper then identifies the main 
constraints to economic growth and poverty reduction in Tajikistan (section 3) and 
examines the role which fiscal policy should play in alleviating these constraints, 
including the priorities for public spending (section 4). Section 5 discusses the 
possibilities for improving the output of public services in the priority areas through 
improvements in the efficiency of expenditure, changes in the sectoral allocation of 
the budget and an expansion of the budget. This is followed in section 6 by an 
analysis of the scope for mobilizing additional budgetary resources for priority 
expenditures from higher domestic revenues, donor grants and government 
borrowing. Section 7 discusses the quasi fiscal deficit in the electricity sector, which 
is one of the most serious threats to long-term growth and fiscal sustainability. The 




2. Review of Recent Economic and Fiscal Performance 
 
Tajikistan’s economy followed a similar path to those of the other Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) following the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991, notably 
a very steep decline in output followed by a recovery beginning in the second half of 
the 1990s.  
 
Large fiscal deficits were incurred in the first half of the 1990s, financed almost 
entirely by credits from the central bank, which fuelled hyperinflation. In addition, 
quasi fiscal deficits led to a sharp build up of government and government guaranteed 
external debt, caused mainly by the government financing imports of commodities 
from Russia and other CIS countries. Serious economic reform began in the second 
half of the 1990s, with the government embarking on an ESAF program in 1998. The 
fiscal deficit was reduced from 11% of GDP in 1995 to an average of just under 3% 
of GDP in the final four years of the 1990s and domestic financing of the fiscal deficit 
  3was cut to an average of 1% of GDP in this period (see figure 1).
2 As a result the 
broad money growth rate was brought down in the second half of the 1990s, which 
enabled inflation to be reduced to 30% by 1999. The reduction in the fiscal deficit in 
the second half of the 1990s was achieved by cutting government expenditures 
sharply, by 40% in real terms: between 1995 and 1999. Cuts in bread subsidies, which 




Real GDP growth, which had begun to recover in 1997, accelerated in the 2000s, 
averaging 9% per annum during 2000-2005. The economic recovery was driven by a 
recovery in total factor productivity (TFP) growth (Matovu, 2005). The collapse of 
output in the first half of the 1990s left large sections of the capital stock under-
utilized, and once this capacity was brought back into production output was able to 
recover rapidly without the need for new investment. In fact capital investment rates 
remained low, even after the economy began to recover: gross fixed capital formation 
averaged only 12.5% of GDP during 1996-2005, a level which was barely high 
enough to generate any growth in the capital stock. Despite the strong recovery in the 
2000s, output is still below the level it had reached in 1990. 
 
Strong growth, better tax administration and a change in the method for determining 
VAT boosted domestic revenues, which rose by more than 6% of GDP from 1999 to 
2006. This allowed government expenditures to increase while maintaining the 
overall fiscal deficit at an average of 3% of GDP during 1995-2006, and avoiding 
virtually any resort to domestic financing of the deficit. Primary government 
expenditures rose from 13% of GDP in 1998 to 21.7% of GDP in 2006. Debt relief 
from Russia and Pakistan in 2004 and from the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 





                                                 
2 These deficits are on a cash basis. There were substantial expenditure and revenue arrears, but the 
lack of a proper treasury system impeded the accurate reporting of these arrears. 
3 Bread subsidies were replaced by cash transfers, but substantial arrears were accumulated on these 
transfer payments.  
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Given that the economy has begun to recover strongly from the contraction of the first 
half of the 1990s, it is pertinent to ask what role fiscal policy played in the recovery. 
The main channel through which fiscal policy supported the economic recovery was 
through improved macroeconomic stability brought about by fiscal adjustment. The 
strong GDP growth achieved during the 2000s was preceded by a substantial fiscal 
adjustment in the second half of the 1990s, which enabled government to cut its 
domestic borrowing sharply. Segura-Ubiergo, Simone and Gupta (2006) examined the 
relationship between fiscal adjustment and growth in CIS countries during the period 
1992-2001, finding a strong correlation between fiscal adjustment and growth in those 
countries which needed to attain macroeconomic stability. They hypothesize that 
fiscal adjustment in the CIS countries boosted economic growth through two 
channels; the reduction in government borrowing requirements and associated 
monetization of deficits, and a credibility effect which signaled government 
commitment to macroeconomic stability and sound fiscal policy. This in turn 
stimulated an expansion of official and private capital inflows (boosted in the case of 
Tajikistan by workers’ remittances) that at least partly substituted for the loss of 
  5transfers from the Soviet Union and helped to restore aggregate demand, mainly 




3. Growth and Development Challenges and Constraints 
 
The key long-term challenges for development policy in Tajikistan are to sustain rapid 
economic growth, to ensure that the benefits of this growth are equitably distributed, 
which requires growth of labor intensive production to create more employment, and 
to reverse the deterioration in social indicators, notably in educational attainment and 
health status that has taken place since the country became independent. The type of 
growth that has occurred during the 2000s, characterized by a shift back towards the 
economy’s production possibility frontier, is unlikely to continue for much longer. 
Sustainable long-term growth will require increased investment and improvements in 
labor productivity to boost the supply side of the economy.  
 
In common with other CIS countries, Tajikistan inherited a large capital stock relative 
to the size of its economy from the Soviet era; hence the economy is capital intensive 
for a low-income country. However much of the capital stock is in the public sector 
and is not well suited for a market economy. Tajikistan needs more investment, but 
the priority should be private investment in marketable goods and services, such as 
non traditional exports and services for domestic consumption. Private investment has 
been very low; amounting to only 5-6% of GDP during 2003-2006.
4  
 
While the macroeconomic environment for private investment has improved 
markedly, some of the institutional features of the investment environment are a 
major constraint to private investment, as shown by business surveys such as the 2005 
Business Environment and Enterprise Survey (BEEPs). The business climate is 
characterized by unpredictability, a lack of transparency and an uneven playing field 
for businesses. Instead of a clear set of rules for all businesses, individual firms make 
their own special arrangements with government officials (World Bank, 2005D: 22-
                                                 
4 This estimate is from the IMF, and probably includes an element of investment by public enterprises. 
  624). Excessive and complex regulations are a barrier to entry by start up businesses 
and a burden on existing firms. The government has begun to implement measures to 
address some of these problems: Parliament enacted and amended legislation in 2005 
and 2006 to streamline licensing procedures and reduce the number of activities 
which are subject to licensing, but there is still much to be done to improve the 
investment climate.  
 
The level and structure of taxes in Tajikistan do not appear to be a major constraint to 
economic growth. The overall tax burden is relatively moderate: taxes amounted to 
only 16.6% of GDP in 2005. It is unlikely that income tax rates impose serious 
disincentives: The corporate income tax rate of 25% is not out of line with 
international rates, while small businesses pay a tax rate of 12%. Tax administration, 
however, is more problematic, and allows too much scope for discretionary decisions 
and predatory behavior on the part of tax officials and the tax police. The BEEPS 
reported that 80% of businesses paid bribes to tax inspectors (World Bank, 2005A: 
17). The tax police are not compatible with modern tax administration practices which 
are based on self-assessment: Instead the existence of a separate tax agency which 
lacks the specialist tax skills needed for tax administration but which has close contact 
with taxpayers encourages corruption (Summers and Baer, 2003: 24). Customs 
procedures are very inefficient and are cited by traders as their biggest problem. 
Customs clearance takes between three and 28 days and requires 60 different 
administrative steps for imports and 40 for exports (World Bank, 2005D). 
 
Is more public investment needed to boost economic growth? The country already has 
a large stock of public infrastructure assets, and in many respects infrastructure assets 
are over-dimensioned for the size of the economy (World Bank, 2006). For example, 
Tajikistan’s production and consumption of electricity per capita is far higher than 
would be expected for a low-income country. However, some of the public 
infrastructure is not especially well suited to complement private sector activity; for 
example, the existing roads were not built for heavy trucks (the rail system carried 
most of the heavy goods during the Soviet era). Nevertheless, there is little evidence 
to indicate that the inadequacies of the transport infrastructure are a major constraint 
to private investment. In the 2005 BEEPS, only 2% of businesses in Tajikistan cited 
transportation as a major obstacle for the growth and operation of their business, 
  7while only 11% of businesses cited it as a moderate obstacle (World Bank, 2006: 
Annex 1). World Bank (2004B) examines constraints to trade in Central Asia and 
concludes that the road networks in the region are relatively extensive and largely 
sufficient to meet the needs of users, although roads are in poor condition because of 
inadequate maintenance. It argues that these countries should focus on the 
maintenance of existing roads, focusing on the core road networks that can be 
maintained on a sustainable basis within the resources available in each country.  
 
Investment in hydroelectric power generation, mainly for export, could make an 
important contribution to economic growth. Tajikistan has enormous hydropower 
potential and neighbors countries which are energy scarce and are potential export 
markets. However, while hydropower exports could boost GDP growth, foreign 
exchange earnings and government revenue, they will create very few jobs in the long 
run, once the construction of these projects is completed, and hence make little direct 
contribution to poverty reduction.  
 
Improving labor productivity is also necessary to sustain long-term growth. Tajikistan 
has the lowest labor productivity among CIS countries, although this may reflect other 
factors besides the quality of the workforce, such as the high cost of doing business in 
the country (World Bank, 2005D: 3). Since independence, the quality of the labor 
force has been undermined for two reasons. First, educational attainments have 
deteriorated, as measured by falling school enrolment and completion rates. It is also 
likely that the quality of education which pupils receive in schools has deteriorated 
sharply, although it is difficult to measure this. The main reason for this is the paucity 
of resources allocated to public education, as a result of which teachers are very badly 
paid (and often absent from work), there are shortages of teaching materials and 
school buildings cannot be properly maintained. Secondly, many of the most 
productive workers have left the country. Many ethnic Russians, who comprised a 
large share of the professional cadres in Tajikistan, left the country in the 1990s. More 
recently many Tajik citizens have migrated to work in Russia, where wages are much 
higher than in Tajikistan; about a third of all males of working age now work outside 
the country on a permanent or seasonal basis (World Bank, 2005D: 58).  
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4. Implications for Fiscal Policy and Public Sector Outputs 
 
The assessment of the constraints to growth in section 3 has clear implications for 
public expenditure policies. Firstly, there is a need to strengthen public provision of 
basic services such as education and health, which both directly improve the welfare 
of the population and enhance human capital, thereby contributing to the long-term 
growth of labor productivity. Given the very low income levels of the majority of 
Tajikistan’s population, it is unlikely that private sector provision of education and 
health services, paid for by the consumers, can meet the country’s needs.  
 
Secondly, new investments in public infrastructure (e.g. transport systems and 
utilities) should not be a high priority because the country is already relatively well 
endowed, for a low-income country, with public infrastructure and there is little 
evidence to indicate that inadequate infrastructure constitutes a serious constraint to 
growth. Moreover, the government does not have the budgetary resources to maintain 
the existing public capital stock properly, let alone an expanded stock of public 
capital. Therefore, instead of investing scarce budgetary resources in new capital 
assets, priority should be given to allocating adequate funds for maintenance of the 
most important components of the existing capital stock.
5  
 
Thirdly, while almost all of Tajikistan’s existing power generation capacity is in the 
public sector, the government should leave investment in new hydropower projects to 
the private sector. The investment costs of potential hydropower projects far outstrips 
government’s borrowing capacity. Moreover, the generation and export of electricity 
is not a public good which needs to be provided by the government. It is a commercial 
enterprise which can be undertaken by the private sector which is more likely provide 
efficient management than government.
6 As discussed in section 7, attracting private 
investment into hydropower projects will require reform of the domestic tariff 
                                                 
5 This is a message which should also be taken on board by Tajikistan’s donors, who have allocated 
most of their aid to the construction of new capital assets rather than funding current expenditures.   
6 Government will make a contribution to the capital of the two major hydropower projects currently 
being planned in the form of existing assets which were put in place during the Soviet era when 
construction of these two projects began, before it was abandoned when the Soviet Union broke up. 
  9structure to eliminate the QFD and ensure the commercial viability of sales to the 
domestic market. 
 
Fourthly, the key policies to promote private sector investment in marketable goods 
and services do not entail major public spending programs. Instead the priority should 
be to maintain macroeconomic stability, to support the development of an efficient 
and competitive financial sector and to reduce the excessive regulation of the private 
sector and create a transparent and level playing field for all private investors.  
 
Fifthly, the business climate will be improved by reforming tax administration so that 
tax liabilities are determined in a transparent manner according to the dictates of the 
tax code, and taxpayers are not subject to arbitrary decisions by tax officials. The 
priority should be to introduce modern principles of tax administration, involving self-
assessment by taxpayers combined with risk based auditing by trained tax auditors 
(Harrison et al, 2005). The tax police should be abolished, for the reasons given in 
section 3. 
 
5. The Efficiency, Composition and Level of Government Expenditure 
 
The conclusions of sections 3 and 4 are that government should increase provision of 
basic social services which enhance human capital and also improve the maintenance 
of existing public capital assets. Fiscal space for these priority expenditures could, in 
principle, be created by improving the technical efficiency of expenditures and 
through reallocating funds within the budget from low to high priority expenditures.   
 
Because of the structure of the budget and the weaknesses in the budget process, 
significant efficiency gains could be generated by improving allocative efficiency. 
First, budget allocations in Tajikistan are still heavily influenced by those which 
pertained during the Soviet era, which were heavily biased towards capital intensive 
technologies, highly centralized service provision and very rigid expenditure 
structures; for example, the health service is overly specialized, segmented and 
hierarchical with a bias in favor of secondary and tertiary health care and against 
primary health care. There are an excessively large number of health facilities in the 
country, around 2,800, many of which cannot be adequately staffed, supplied with 
  10necessary inputs such as medicines, or properly maintained. In the education sector, 
employee compensation consumes 83% of the recurrent expenditure in the local 
budgets, from which most schools are funded, leaving insufficient funds for teaching 
materials and essential classroom maintenance.  
 
Secondly, the budget process in Tajikistan and the technical capacities of budget 
planners are ill suited for aligning expenditure allocations with strategic objectives or 
evaluating the costs and benefits of competing expenditure demands. There are no 
clear institutional mechanisms to translate expenditure policy objectives into budget 
estimates during the annual budget process. The major constraint is the extreme 
fragmentation of the budget process, whereby over 100 key budget organizations   
(KBOs), including 17 local authorities, draw up and submit budget estimates directly 
to the Ministry of Finance (MOF). This process largely bypasses the line ministries, 
which have responsibility for formulating sector policies but have control over only a 
small fraction of the budget in their respective sectors, especially in education and 
health where most expenditures are covered by the local budget. As a result, line 
ministries cannot ensure that the sectoral spending priorities are actually reflected in 
the budget submissions of KBOs. These problems are compounded because the 
technical capacities within line ministries, let alone other KBOs, for formulating 
budgets other than in a purely mechanical manner is very limited. The result is a 
budget system in which most current expenditures are determined mechanically on 
the basis of input norms (e.g. number of classrooms in place), rather than on the basis 
of coherent spending priorities, which tends to perpetuate the existing allocations and 
prevent a shift towards more optimal allocations. 
 
The allocation of capital expenditures, including those funded from the state budget as 
well as the donor funded Public Investment Program (PIP), is determined separately 
from the rest of the budget process, which means that capital expenditures cannot be 
integrated into broader sector expenditure plans, nor are the recurrent cost 
implications of capital projects adequately taken into consideration when planning 
these projects. Furthermore, capital budgeting suffers from many other deficiencies in 
the project planning and selection stages. There are no clear criteria for determining 
whether a proposed capital project accords with budgetary priorities. Ex-ante project 
appraisal is rudimentary at best, and does not include cost-benefit analysis. Hence 
  11there is little reason to suppose that the capital budget is allocated in an efficient 
manner.  
 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to quantify the scope for improving technical or allocative 
efficiency of expenditures because of the paucity and unreliability of data. For 
example, the measures of outcomes in key areas such as health and education are 
unreliable.  
 
The composition of government expenditure 
Tajikistan’s government expenditures comprise the state budget and the PIP which is 
funded by external donors. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the 2006 state budget by 
functional classification. There is no functional breakdown of the PIP. 
 
Government expenditure on health and education is low, at 1.3% and 4% of GDP 
respectively in 2006. Health expenditures command just 7% of the state budget, less 
than half of the international target of 15%. Government expenditure on health care 
amounts to the equivalent of about $5 per capita, compared to the target set by the 
WHO of $40 per capita.
7 Current expenditure in the transport sector of the state 
budget, which includes all of the maintenance costs for roads, comprises only 0.5% of 
GDP, which is unlikely to be anywhere near sufficient to fund the road maintenance 
requirements, especially as a major backlog of essential repairs has built up. 
 
Increased budgetary allocations to education, health and road maintenance would 
appear to be unavoidable if significant improvements in these services are to be 
achieved. The Health Finance Reform Strategy envisages government spending on 
health rising to 2.8% of GDP by 2015, an increase of 1.5% of GDP from the 2006 
level (World Bank, 2005B: 39). It will probably be necessary to increase education 
spending by about 2% of GDP and to raise expenditures on infrastructure 
maintenance by about 1% of GDP: in total, therefore, this will require additional 
spending in these critical sectors of 4.5% of GDP, or about 25% of the state budget. In 
addition to this, expenditure of approximately 1.5% of GDP will be required over the 
                                                 
7 Compared to other CIS countries, Tajikistan spends about the same proportion of GDP on education 
but only just over half as much on health (Lorie, 2003: 26), although it is arguable that most of the CIS 
countries need to spend more on these sectors to reverse the decline in human capital which has 
occurred since the break up of the Soviet Union. 
  12medium term to meet higher government utility bills and energy compensation 
mechanism payments as a result of planned electricity tariff rises, and to fund higher 
interest payments on external debt, bringing the total for additional priority and 
unavoidable expenditures to 6% of GDP, or around 33% of the existing size of the 
state budget. Can this be achieved through inter-sectoral re-allocations?  
 
It will not be possible to re-allocate funds from the social protection sector, because 
the majority of expenditures are statutory payments such as pensions which are 
financed from social (payroll) taxes. This will leave approximately 50% of the state 
budget, amounting to about 9% of GDP, from which in principle it might be possible 
to effect re-allocations to the priority sectors. In practice, achieving such re-
allocations will not be possible, because cuts of two thirds in expenditures in the non 
priority sectors would be required to free up budgetary resources of 6% of GDP for 
the priority sectors, together with the unavoidable expenditures on interest payments, 
utilities and energy compensation, and there will be political constraints to making 
cuts of this magnitude to two of the largest sectors of the budget, public 
administration and law enforcement. Realistically, therefore, if spending on the 
priority sectors of education, health and infrastructure maintenance is to be increased, 
an expansion of the state budget will be required. 
 
 
  13Table 1 
 
Composition of State Budget Expenditures by Functional Classification, 2006 
Budget 
Percent of Percent of 
State Budget GDP
State Budget Expenditures 100.0% 18.4%
Public admin bodies & foreign econ relations 12.0% 2.2%
Law enforcement structures 15.5% 2.8%
Social Sphere  49.5% 9.1%
  education 21.8% 4.0%
  health 6.9% 1.3%
  social protection 12.4% 2.3%
  compensations 2.4% 0.4%
  culture and sports 3.7% 0.7%
  other social services 2.2% 0.4%
Economic services 15.2% 2.8%
  agriculture and agro-indistrial complex 3.2% 0.6%
  transport and communications 4.9% 0.9%
  mining and construction 0.7% 0.1%
  fuel and energy 1.7% 0.3%
  utilities 4.4% 0.8%
  other economic services 0.3% 0.1%
Other expenses 4.6% 0.8%
Interest payments 3.3% 0.6%
  external  2.3% 0.4%
  domestic 1.0% 0.2%
PIP spending from external sources 4.0%
Total expenditures including external PIP 22.4%
      




The level of government expenditure 
The overall level of government expenditures is still relatively moderate, at 22% of 
GDP, so an expansion of the budget need not necessarily be sub-optimal in terms of 
efficient resource allocation provided that additional budgetary resources can be 
mobilized to fund it. However, a note of caution is warranted. The findings of the 
World Bank’s ECA Regional Fiscal Study have important implications for the level of 
  14public expenditure (Gray, Lane and Varoudakis, 2007). The study found that, in 
countries with poor governance, which include Tajikistan which is ranked second 
worse among 27 Eastern Europe and Central Asian countries in terms of government 
effectiveness, potentially productive public expenditures (defined as education, 
health, housing and economic affairs, including transport) have little positive impact 
on economic growth whereas unproductive public expenditures have a negative 
impact. Consequently, in countries with poor governance, large total public 
expenditures reduce growth, probably because they require high levels of taxation 
which distort incentives for work, investment and saving; hence growth is maximized 
by keeping the size of government small. The implications for Tajikistan are that 
increased government expenditures in the priority sectors will have to be 
accompanied by marked improvements in the quality of governance if these are to 
have a positive impact on economic growth. 
 
 
6. Mobilizing Resources for Increased Government Expenditure 
 
This section examines the scope for mobilizing additional budgetary resources to fund 
the priority expenditures identified above, from domestic revenues, donor grants and 
borrowing. Raising budgetary resources must be consistent with two essential policy 
objectives: first the need to maintain macroeconomic stability, and secondly, the need 
to maintain fiscal sustainability, which given the very limited scope for domestic 
borrowing, largely entails restraining the growth of external public debt to levels 
which are sustainable in the long run. 
  
6.1 Domestic Revenues 
While mobilizing greater domestic revenues is obviously a preferred option from the 
standpoint of minimizing the risks to macroeconomic stability and fiscal 
sustainability, this should not be done at the expense of increasing the tax burden on 
the economy in a manner which distorts incentives for saving, investment and work 
and for efficient resource allocation. Domestic revenues amounted to 18.8% of GDP 
in 2006. Key features of Tajikistan’s tax system are also shared by other CIS 
countries, notably the importance of payroll taxes and the relatively small share of 
trade taxes in total revenue (Lorie, 2003).  
  15 
Lorie (2003), investigating tax performance in CIS economies, regressed the tax 
revenue to GDP ratio on PPP GDP per capita for a large sample of developed, 
transitional and emerging market economies, with an additional regression which 
included a dummy variable for the OECD, graduating transition and CIS countries. 
The predicted tax revenue to GDP ratio for Tajikistan was 13.6% and 18.1% in the 
regressions with, and without, a dummy respectively. Tajikistan’s tax revenue had 
reached 16.6% of GDP in 2006, hence it is not out of line with what would be 
expected based on the country’s per capita income. 
 
There are three potential sources of growth in domestic revenues as a share of GDP: 
First, the income elasticity of some tax handles; secondly, changes in tax policy (tax 




Domestic Revenues, 2000 and 2006 Outturns and Projections for 2011 and 2016; 
Percentage of GDP 
 
  2000 2006 2011    2016   
Domestic  Revenues  13.9 18.8 20.6  22.7 
 Tax Revenue  12.9  16.6  18.3  19.2 
   Impact of Tax admin reform  n.a.  n.a.  0.7  1.4 
   Taxes excluding tax admin reform  12.9  16.6  17.6  17.8 
       Individual Income tax  1.2  1.2  2.1  2.4 
       Profit Tax  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6 
       Social Taxes  1.6  2.0  2.0  2.0 
       Sales tax (on exports)  3.3  0.6  0.6  0.6 
       VAT  2.5  7.4  7.8  7.7 
       Excise Duty  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.7 
       Customs Duty  1.4  0.9  0.9  0.9 
       Other Taxes  1.8  2.9  2.9  2.9 
    Non Tax Revenue  1.0  2.2  2.4  3.5 
       Revenue from HPP projects  -  -  0.1  1.3 
       Other  1.0  2.2  2.3  2.2 





  16Buoyancy and Income Elasticity of Taxes   
Domestic revenues have been quite buoyant since 2000, rising by 4.9% of GDP in six 
years (table 2). This buoyancy is mainly attributable to VAT on imports, which 
adding 4.5% of GDP to tax collections, as result of a boom in imports (fuelled by 
remittances) and changes in the methodology for calculating the VAT from the origin 
to the destination principle for trade with CIS countries in the early 2000s (IMF, 
2006: 10); i.e. the VAT on goods which are traded between Tajikistan and other CIS 
countries is levied by the importer (destination) instead of the exporter (origin). As 
Tajikistan has a large trade deficit with other CIS countries, the change in 
methodology for applying the VAT served to greatly expand the VAT base.
8 
 
The continued buoyancy of the tax system mainly depends on the extent to which 
VAT on imports continues to grow as a share of GDP. The only other tax handles to 
have displayed any buoyancy are the social taxes but these are earmarked for 
pensions. The natural income elasticity of individual income taxes has been dampened 
by their very low marginal rates. But it seems unlikely that VAT on imports will 
continue to be buoyant. Imports are already high as a share of GDP, especially for a 
landlocked country, and so will probably not rise further. The main factor that led to 
the buoyancy displayed by VAT on imports during the 2000s, the change in the 
methodology for computing the VAT, is a one off effect which will not be repeated.  
 
Changes in Tax Policy 
What scope is there for raising more tax revenue through tax policy changes without 
creating distortions to resource allocation which would impede growth, which 
requires that tax rates should be moderate and not out of line with international levels?  
Corporate profits are currently taxed at 25%, a rate which is in line with the 
unweighted average corporate profit tax for CIS countries and the transition countries 
of Eastern Europe (Lorrie, 2003: 38). Hence this rate should not be raised if Tajikistan 
wants to create a regionally competitive tax environment for business.  
 
Personal income tax (PIT) rates are low. The current top marginal rate of 13% is 
much lower than the equivalent in other CIS countries, which ranges from 20% to 
                                                 
8 Levying VAT on the basis of the origin of imports was common to all CIS countries for their intra-
CIS trade, but most have now switched to the destination basis.  
  1735% (Summers and Baer, 2003: 7). Less than 5% of labor income was collected in 
personal income taxes in 2004, which is attributable to both the schedule of low rates 
and the fact that the incomes of a large proportion of workers fall below the threshold 
at which tax begins to be paid. Nevertheless it should be possible to increase the 
average PIT collection to about 10% of labor income by raising the top marginal rate 
to 25% and levying a rate of 10-15% on average incomes, which would generate 
additional revenue of about 1% of GDP. Raising PIT rates could also make the 
personal income tax more income elastic, because the schedule of taxes will become 
more progressive. The top marginal PIT rate should be set at the same level as that of 
the corporate income tax rate, in line with international best practice, to remove the 
opportunity for the owners of small businesses to reduce their tax liabilities by 
shifting income from profits to their own salary. There is also a case on equity 
grounds for raising the top marginal rate of PIT. 
 
VAT is the single most important tax handle, but the rate is already 20% (and is 
effectively 22% because of the road user tax which is also levied on the VAT base). 
This is at the high end of VAT rates worldwide, so an increase in the rate is 
unadvisable.  
 
Customs duties rates are relatively low: there are seven rates with a range of between 
0% and 15%. Moreover, although imports are high as a share of GDP, the customs tax 
base is much narrower because around three quarters of all imports originate in CIS 
countries with which Tajikistan has signed free trade agreements. Hence any increase 
in customs tariffs would apply to a minority of imports which would limit its potential 
for revenue generation, as well as distorting the pattern of trade.  
 
Tax Administration 
Improvements in tax administration offer the greatest scope for enhancing domestic 
revenue. Some progress has already been made in reforming tax administration. The 
tax department has been restructured along functional lines and a Large Taxpayer 
Unit (LTU) set up. New tax and customs codes were introduced in 2005. 
Nevertheless, major weaknesses in tax administration have still to be rectified. The 
priority for tax administration reform should be to introduce modern tax 
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9 Tax officials should stop 
attempting to manually verify every tax return, and instead adopt the principle under 
which taxpayers are expected to comply voluntarily, through self-assessment. The 
auditing system needs to be strengthened, with better trained auditors undertaking 
audits selected on the basis of greatest risk. The law should be revised to enforce the 
quoting of a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) on all invoices. Efficiency in tax 
administration can be enhanced by the introduction of IT systems for taxpayer 
registration and accounting and core administration functions.  
 
Over the longer term the structure of the tax department should be re-organized to 
reduce the number of small tax offices in the regions which play a marginal role in tax 
collection.
10 Large taxpayers should be handled by the LTU, which needs 
strengthening. Model tax inspectorates should be established in each of the three 
regions to handle medium sized taxpayers. The closure of small offices, 
computerization plus a change in working practices will then allow the number of 
officials employed by in tax administration to be reduced by at least 50% (i.e. from 
the current level of around 1600 to 750). This would enable salaries for the remaining 
staff to be raised substantially which would provide better incentives to attract and 
retain higher caliber staff and reduce incentives for corruption. The customs 
department can also be strengthened through the upgrading of facilities and 
infrastructure at border posts, developing application systems and procedures to 
support modern customs practices and training customs officers (Harrison et al, 
2005).  
 
How much additional revenue could tax administration reforms generate? Although it 
is difficult to be precise, based on the experience of other developing countries which 
implemented major reforms to tax administration, an increase in tax revenue of 
around 8-10% should be attainable over the long term.
11   
                                                 
9 These paragraphs are based on the recommendations for reform of an ADB funded tax administration 
reform project and the recommendations in Harrison et al (2005).  
10 The geographical fragmentation of the tax system reflects the system of financing local government 
budgets, whereby a proportion of taxes collected locally is retained by local authorities (and usually 
supplemented by transfers from the center). The rationalisation of tax offices, therefore, must be linked 
to changes in the financing of local government budgets.  
11 The Asian Development Bank’s Tax Administration Modernisation project is expected to boost 
revenue from domestic taxes by 5% in the year following implementation and by a further 2.5% in the 
subsequent three years (ADB, 2007: 30). 
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Long-term revenue projections  
Table 2 provides projections for domestic revenues as a share of GDP in 2010 and 
2015.
12 The main assumptions underlying these projections are as follows. First, with 
increased marginal tax rates, the tax collected from individual income tax as a share 
of labor income rises from the current level of slightly over 4% to 8% by 2011, and by 
a further 0.25% of labor income per year thereafter, to reflect what should be the 
natural elasticity of this tax handle. Formal sector labor income as a share of GDP is 
assumed to be constant. Secondly, VAT is boosted slightly by the net impact of higher 
electricity tariffs. Thirdly, other tax handles grow broadly in line with nominal GDP, 
before the impact of tax administration reforms. Fourthly, the gains from tax 
administration reforms are projected at a cumulative 1% of total tax revenue per year 
starting in 2008, hence by 2006 they boost tax revenues by 9%. Fifthly, the revenue 
projections also include the projected revenue earned from government’s capital 
investment in the two major hydropower projects, and the surplus in the form of taxes 
or royalties which can be earned from electricity exports. The net impact is that 
domestic revenues increase by 3.9% of GDP, from 18.8% of GDP in 2006 to 22.7% 
in 2016.  
 
Grants 
Donor grants to the government budget have been low, although project grants may 
be under-reported. Excluding the MDRI debt relief received in 2006, grants to the 
budget amounted to 1.8% of GDP on 2006. The majority of donor grants are 
disbursed to agencies outside the government budget, such as community based 
organizations, in part because of concerns about fiduciary weaknesses in the budget.
13 
Future levels of grant aid to the budget, the form of budget support and project aid, 
could be boosted if donor governments increase their overall aid to Tajikistan, in line 
with commitments made at international fora to expand aid in real terms to the poorest 
countries, and/or if a larger share of donor aid were to be channeled to the government 
budget.  
                                                 
12 A detailed explanation of the assumptions underlying these projections can be found in World Bank 
(2006: chapter 3). 
13 An estimated $114 million of grant aid from donor organizations was disbursed outside the budget in 
2005 compared to $45 million of grants (excluding MDRI debt relief) disbursed to the budget in the 
form of both budget support and project aid. The estimate for the non budget grants is a minimum 
because data were not available from all donors. 
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Table 3 
 
Budget Resources for Primary Expenditure: Domestic Revenues, Grants, 
Borrowing and Interest Payments; 2006 and Projections for 2007-11 and 2012-16 
   
          Percentage of GDP    
2006 2007-11 2012-16
average average
Domestic Revenue 18.8% 19.8% 21.8%
Grants 1.2% 2.0% 2.2%
Borrowing 1.1% 8.5% 3.0%
 Net External Borrowing 1.6% 8.8% 3.2%
  Disbursements 2.9% 10.0% 4.9%
  Amortisation -1.3% -1.3% -1.7%
 Net Domestic Borrowing -0.5% -0.2% -0.2%
Privatisation Receipts 0.5%
Interest Payments 0.5% 0.9% 1.0%
Budget Resources for Primary Expenditure 21.1% 29.5% 25.9%
NPV External PPG debt/GDP 23% 41% 40%
NPV External PPG debt/exports 99% 174% 163%
Notes, grants and domestic borrowing exclude the MDRI debt relief in 2006 
Source: 2006, IMF, 2007-11 and 2012-16 are author’s projections  
 
 
It is very difficult to make any quantitative projections of the volume of budget grants 
over the long term, because the range of possible outcomes is so large. At the low end 
of the range, Tajikistan might receive no increase in grants, because donors remain 
unconvinced that fiduciary standards are improving sufficiently and/or because 
Tajikistan contracts more loan finance from non traditional lenders, thereby reducing 
the perceived need for more grant aid. At the other end of the range, grants could 
increase several fold, possibly to around 5% of GDP, as donors both increase grant 
aid to Tajikistan as part of a more general expansion of development assistance to 
low-income countries and channel a much larger share of their grant aid to the 
government budget. The latter will clearly require improvements in PFM to 
strengthen and make more transparent the budget process and to improve the 
allocation of expenditures, especially in those sectors which can contribute to meeting 
  21the MDGs. The assumption we have used here is that donor grants will increase by 
10% a year in dollar terms, using the 2007 budget projection as a base, which is 
consistent with the commitment made by the G8 countries in 2005 to increase their 
aid to poor countries by 60% by 2010. We assume that the 10% growth in grants will 
be sustained through to 2016. As shown in table 3, the projected average level of 
budget grants during 2007-11 is 2% of GDP and that during 2012-2016 is 2.2% of 
GDP. This represents an increase in budgetary resources of approximately 1.4% of 
GDP from the 2006 level. However, these projections are unavoidably highly 
speculative and depend to a large extent on decisions which are outside the control of 
the Tajikistan government. 
 
Domestic Borrowing 
The main constraint on government domestic borrowing is the need to maintain 
macroeconomic stability without crowding out private sector borrowing from the 
banking system. Government’s domestic debt stock is small, at around 4% of GDP, 
hence the sustainability of the domestic debt stock is not the binding constraint on 
domestic borrowing. Given the low level of domestic debt, government could issue 
more domestic debt and remain solvent, but the issuance of more government debt 
faces three constraints: the very narrow domestic monetary system (broad money was 
only 8.5% of GDP at the end of 2006), the high level of dollarization of the banking 
system (foreign currency deposits are 69% of total bank deposits), and the lack of 
significant non bank financial institutions. The poorly developed domestic financial 
sector also constrains the use of alternative macroeconomic instruments to create 
fiscal space. If government were to fund a more expansionary fiscal policy by 
borrowing from the central bank the latter would then face the need to sterilize the 
base money thus created, but its ability to do so is constrained by the same 
characteristics of the domestic financial system which restrict the scope for 
government borrowing from the domestic market.  
 
To derive projections of domestic borrowing consistent with macroeconomic stability 
we assume that only borrowing from the central bank and commercial banks is 
possible: this is because the non bank financial sector is too small to hold any 
significant amount of government debt. Borrowing from the central bank is driven by 
the imperative of controlling reserve money growth and accumulating foreign 
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14 We assume that the velocity of circulation of reserve money will fall at 
2.5% per year. We assume that foreign reserves increase at the same rate as imports, 
thereby maintaining the foreign reserve to import cover constant, while foreign 
exchange liabilities, valued in current dollars, remain constant. To meet these targets, 
the central bank’s lending to the government must be an average of negative 0.4% of 
GDP per annum during 2007-16.  
 
The constraints on government borrowing from the commercial banks are the growth 
of their liabilities and the extent to which government wants to avoid competing with 
the private sector and public enterprises for the very limited pool of commercial bank 
credit. Commercial bank liabilities are mainly deposits, but more than two thirds of 
deposits are foreign currency denominated deposits and we assume that commercial 
banks will not use foreign currency deposits to fund purchases of government debt 
because of the currency mismatch that this would entail. We assume that government 
will restrict its net borrowing from commercial banks to 30% of the increase of 
domestic currency deposits, thereby leaving the remaining 70% of the increase of 
domestic currency deposits to fund lending to the private sector and public 
enterprises, as well as holdings of cash reserves and other assets. We assume that the 
velocity of circulation of Somoni deposits will fall by 5% per annum. Government 
borrowing from the commercial banks is positive but very small, averaging only 0.1% 
of GDP per year during 2007-2016. Net domestic borrowing, the sum of net 
borrowing from the central bank and commercial banks, is slightly negative over the 
next 10 years, averaging 0.2% of GDP per annum (see table 3). This is slightly larger 
than the average so far during the 2000s (i.e. the savings are slightly less) but the 




The major constraint on external borrowing is the need to maintain external debt 
sustainability, rather than the availability of loans from foreign creditors. The 
Government’s net external financing will increase dramatically over the medium term 
as a result of its contracting of a $604 million loan for infrastructure projects from 
                                                 
14 The detailed assumptions can be found in World Bank (2007: chapter 3). 
  23China. In addition Government has guaranteed more than $300 million in external 
loans to cotton traders. Net external financing is projected to rise to around 14% of 
GDP in 2007 and 2008 before falling to 11% of GDP in 2009. This will lift the NPV 
of Tajikistan’s PPG external debt over at least two of the five thresholds at which debt 
is deemed sustainable under the IMF/IDA Low-Income Country Debt Sustainability 
Assessment Framework.  
 
Our projections for external financing are derived using the following methodology. 
For the 2007-2011 period we adopt the projections made in the most recent DSA, 
which was completed in January 2007 (IMF & World Bank, 2007). External loan 
disbursements and amortization in this period mainly reflect the implementation of 
loan agreements already signed. We make our own projections for 2012-16. After 
2011 there is more scope for loan disbursements to vary, as these will involve loan 
contracts not yet signed. As the purpose of this chapter is to assess the scope for fiscal 
space which is consistent with sustainable borrowing, our projections are based on the 
assumption that the government will aim to bring back, over the long term, its 
external debt indicators to levels which do not exceed the thresholds at which external 
debt is deemed unsustainable, by restricting new external borrowing. Hence, given the 
projected loan repayments and the grant element of the loans, we construct a profile 
of loan disbursements which ensures that all sustainability indicators are met by 2016. 
 
The projected net external financing over the medium term will lift the NPV of debt 
to both GDP and exports above the sustainability thresholds, although the indicators 
will start to decline after 2009. The NPV of debt to exports is the most problematic, as 
this exceeds the threshold by the largest margin. Under our projections, this indicator 
falls back to the threshold of 150% by 2016. The NPV of debt to GDP returns to the 
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External loan disbusements as percent of GDP and the implied path of the NPV 
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Chart 2 presents the profile of external loan disbursements and the NPV of debt to 
exports from 2005 to 2016. As can be seen from the chart, once the projected increase 
in external loan disbursements during 2007-09 has been absorbed, there is very little 
scope left for any further increase in external borrowing without breaching the debt 
sustainability ceilings. The sustainable level of gross public external borrowing is 
only about 5% of GDP, and even this level of borrowing would be unsustainable if the 
country were to suffer a major shock to GDP growth or export growth. This is one of 
the key policy messages of this paper: the government cannot solve its budgetary 
resource constraints through higher external borrowing on a sustainable basis, even if 
external lenders are willing to extend it more credit in the medium term, because that 
will jeopardize long-term debt sustainability. 
 
 
Summary of resource envelope projections 
The projected budgetary resources for primary expenditures are shown in table 3. We 
have not included privatization receipts, because these resources are too uncertain and 
are also not sustainable in the long term. Compared to 2006, when primary 
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projected to be 8.4% of GDP higher on average during 2007-11, mainly because of 
higher capital expenditure funded by external borrowing, and 4.8% of GDP higher 
during 2012-16. Although the budget resource envelope is smaller in 2011-16 than in 
the preceding five year period, it is more sustainable, because the expansion is driven 
by increased revenues rather than unsustainable levels of external borrowing. 
Moreover, because increased revenues are not earmarked for specific project 
expenditures, after 2011 there will be more flexibility in the budget to allocate 
resources to priority recurrent expenditures.   
 
 
7. Tackling the Quasi Fiscal Deficit 
 
The electricity sector has consistently incurred large quasi fiscal deficits in serving the 
domestic market.
15 The QFD in the sector is the difference between the actual 
revenue collected in cash by Barki Tajik, the state owned electricity utility, and the 
revenue which would be collected if it set electricity tariffs at levels sufficient to 
cover the long run average incremental cost (LRAIC) which is used as a proxy for 
long run marginal cost, and reduced its technical and collection losses to levels which 
are in line with international norms (World Bank, 2005C).
16  
                                                
 
The electricity sector QFD arises from three sources. First, Barki Tajik incurs 
technical and commercial losses which in 2005 amounted to 17% of electricity 
supplied to the domestic market, as a result of a loss of electricity in the distribution 
system, theft of electricity, defective metering and inappropriate use of norm based 
billing for customers without meters, compared to a norm for technical and 
commercial losses of 10%. Evaluated at the LRAIC, the excess technical losses 
amount to $25 million in 2006. Secondly, the LRAIC is estimated at 2.3 cents per 
KWh in 2006 prices, compared to the average tariff charged by Barki Tajik of 0.6 
 
15 Energy sector QFDs are a feature of most CIS countries, for the similar reasons as in Tajikistan. In 
2002, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan all had energy sector QFDs of close to 
10% of GDP or higher (Saavalainen and Berge, 2006). 
16  The gas industry also incurred QFDs in recent years, estimated at 1.3% of GDP in 2002 
(Saavalainen and Berge, 2006: 9), but these have now been eliminated through tariff increases. 
 
  26cents per KWh in 2006. The losses arising from charging average tariffs which are not 
much more than a quarter of the LRAIC are projected to reach $210 million in 2006. 
Thirdly, Barki Tajik incurs losses because only 67% of the electricity bills it issues to 
its customers are actually paid in cash, compared to the international norm of 98%. 
These losses amount to a further $27 million. The total QFD, therefore, is estimated at 
$262 million, or 9.3% of GDP, in 2006.  
 
Unless it is eliminated, the electricity sector QFD will have a serious detrimental 
impact on the prospects for economic growth and public finances in Tajikistan. 
Although the QFDs have, to date, not been subsidized directly through the 
government budget,
17 this is not sustainable in the long run, and some form of 
government subsidy will eventually become inevitable unless the QFDs are 
eliminated, because Barki Tajik will not be able to fund the investment and associated 
operational and maintenance costs which are required to rehabilitate the electricity 
transmission and distribution system and keep it functioning at an adequate standard. 
Consequently either the costs of the QFD will have to be borne from the government 
budget, thereby reducing fiscal space by an equivalent amount, or the electricity 
supply system will deteriorate, reducing the supply and reliability of electricity to 
customers, which will inevitably have a negative impact on economic growth. Clearly 
the government budget cannot accommodate subsidies of more than 9% of GDP 
(which would require cutting primary expenditures by half), but neither can the 
economy afford a collapse of the electricity supply.  
 
To eliminate the QFD in the electricity sector it will be necessary for Barki Tajik to 
reduce its technical and commercial losses and its billing losses, through better 
metering and enforcement of payment of bills, for example, and to raise the average 
tariff to the LRAIC. The latter will involve domestic consumers, commercial 
consumers and government all paying much higher electricity tariffs. The costs to the 
budget of higher government electricity bills and the costs of compensating low 
income electricity consumers through the Energy Compensation Mechanism (ECM) 
will amount to more than 1% of GDP. Nevertheless, raising electricity tariffs to the 
LRAIC of supplying electricity cannot be avoided. Moreover, unless the finances of 
                                                 
17 An exception was in 2001 when Barki Tajik defaulted on tax payments because of liquidity 
constraints. 
  27Barki Tajik are put on a sound footing through tariff reform and loss reduction, it is 
very unlikely that private investment can be attracted into new hydropower generation 




8. Implications for the Design of Fiscal Policy 
 
Since the late 1990s fiscal policy has played a crucial role in supporting the economic 
recovery in Tajikistan through the macroeconomic stabilization of the economy. 
While it crucial that fiscal policy continues to provide the foundation for 
macroeconomic stability in the future, fiscal policy must play a greater role in 
strengthening the supply side of the economy, in particular through the delivery of 
key public services which can complement private investment and enhance human 
capital.   
 
The priorities for public expenditure should be improving public services for 
education and health, both of which have deteriorated since independence, and 
providing adequate maintenance for the most important components of the public 
infrastructure. Building new public infrastructure should not be an expenditure 
priority for the government because Tajikistan is already endowed with an extensive 
stock of public infrastructure assets which it inherited from the Soviet era and which 
is too large to be properly maintained with the budgetary resources available to the 
government. While the economy would benefit from major investments in 
hydropower generation, mainly for export to neighboring countries, these are 
commercially viable projects rather than public goods and this investment should be 
led by the private sector to ensure that these projects are managed efficiently. 
Moreover the magnitude of resources required for the hydropower generation projects 
far outstrips the borrowing capacity of government.   
 
There should be some scope for expanding public service provision in the priority 
areas of education, health and infrastructure maintenance by improving the efficiency 
of government expenditure. Government expenditures are characterized by substantial 
technical and allocative inefficiencies, although it is the difficult to quantify the 
  28magnitude of this. The major priorities for public financial management reform are to 
improve the budget resource allocation system, by introducing sector based budgeting 
as a part of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework in the major sectors of the 
budget, and to strengthen the efficiency of budget implementation through reforms to 
procurement, payroll management, financial reporting and auditing, etc. But this will 
entail a very difficult set of institutional reforms which are likely to take a long time 
before substantial benefits can be derived. Consequently it does not appear plausible 
that major improvements in public service provision in the priority areas can be 
achieved through increases in the efficiency of government expenditures alone, except 
in the very long term. Therefore more budgetary resources will have to be allocated to 
the priority expenditure areas. 
 
In 2006 Government allocated, from the state budget, expenditures equivalent to 4% 
and 1.3% of GDP to education and health respectively, while expenditures on the 
maintenance of the transport infrastructure were less than 1% of GDP. Additional 
resources of about 4.5% of GDP will probably be needed to fund these priority areas 
of expenditure, to which must be added additional expenditures of around 1.5% of 
GDP on what are largely unavoidable expenditures such as higher utility bills and 
interest payments, which together amounts to more than a third of the size of the 
existing state budget. It is not realistic to expect that these priority expenditures can be 
funded from reallocations from within the existing budget alone, because the cuts 
required to the non statutory expenditures (excluding pensions) would be very severe. 
Therefore an expansion of the budget will be required to accommodate all of the 
additional expenditures in the priority areas. 
 
Over the long term, domestic revenues offer the best prospects for mobilizing more 
budgetary resources. Although there is only limited scope for raising more tax 
revenue through tax policy changes – an exception would be to raise marginal 
personal income tax rates – reforms to tax administration which is characterized by 
major weaknesses, could generate a significant gain in tax revenue, while the 
government budget could also be boosted by revenues earned from new hydropower 
projects. Although domestic revenue gains in the medium term will be quite modest, 
gains of 4% of GDP could be realized in the long term. The tax burden on the private 
sector is not excessive in terms of the aggregate tax level but tax administration 
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of the priorities for tax reform is to create a more market friendly system of tax 
administration based on self-assessment with effective audit and enforcement.  
 
Donor grants have not made a major contribution to the government budget. Although 
Tajikistan has received quite a large amount of donor grant aid, equivalent to around 
4-5% of GDP in the 2000s, the majority of this has not been disbursed to the 
government budget, partly because of donor concerns about poor fiduciary standards 
in government. The budget could benefit from larger inflows of grant aid if Tajikistan 
were to receive more aid from donors and/or if donors were to channel more of their 
aid to the government budget, but the latter will require marked improvements in 
PFM to assure donors that their aid funds will be well spent. Projecting the long-term 
trends in donor grants is very problematic, but it is probably realistic to expect a 
modest increase in grant aid to the budget, in line with the commitments made by 
major donors to increase their aid budgets for the poorest countries, which will raise 
budget grants to around 2% of GDP.    
 
Although the current size of domestic debt is not a threat to government solvency, 
domestic borrowing is constrained by the imperative of maintaining macroeconomic 
stability. The domestic financial system is simply too shallow to accommodate any 
but the smallest of government borrowing requirements, hence government domestic 
borrowing will inevitably either crowd out private sector credit from the commercial 
banks or lead to growth in the money supply if funded from the central bank. 
Therefore, government cannot expand its budget envelope by increasing its domestic 
borrowing. 
 
Maintaining external debt sustainability is the major constraint on external borrowing. 
The government has contracted new loans, notably from China, which will raise 
disbursements of external debt to 10% of GDP on average during 2007-11, but this 
level of borrowing is not sustainable over the long term. New disbursements will have 
to fall back to an average of 5% of GDP in the following five years if the NPV of the 
external debt is to be brought back into line with the sustainability thresholds set out 
in the IMF/IDA Low-Income Countries Debt Sustainability Framework.  
 
  30Combining the projections for domestic revenues, grants and borrowing indicates that 
budget resources for primary expenditures are projected to increase, compared to the 
level in 2006, by 8% of GDP on average during 2007-11 and by 5% of GDP on 
average during 2012-16. However, a large part of the increase during 2007-11 is 
attributable to external borrowing for infrastructure projects and is not therefore 
available for funding the priority current expenditures. It is only in the 2012-16 
period, when more than half of the increase in the budget envelope is attributable to 
higher domestic revenues, that the budget resources for current expenditure priorities 
will expand significantly. 
 
A major threat to both the sustainability of public finances and the prospects for future 
growth is the quasi fiscal deficit (QFD) incurred by the electricity sector, which is 
estimated at 9% of GDP in 2006. Eliminating the QFD will require substantial rises in 
electricity tariffs (which will also have an impact on the government budget) as well 
as loss reduction measures by Barki Tajik. If the QFD is not eliminated, Barki Tajik 
will not be able to undertake the essential maintenance and rehabilitation of the 
electricity transmission and distribution network, with disastrous consequences for the 
availability and reliability of electricity supply, unless these costs are borne by the 
government budget, in which case they will crowd out expenditures for essential 
public services and/or destabilize public finances. 
 
While the resource envelope projections presented in this paper indicate that it should 
be possible for government to mobilize sufficient resources to increase primary 
expenditures substantially over the next decade it is necessary to sound a note of 
caution. The experience of the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia 
suggests a clear link between the benefits or costs of higher government expenditure 
and the quality of governance. Higher total government expenditure tends to depress 
economic growth in countries with poor governance, and even expenditures on what 
should be productive sectors such as education appear to have little impact on growth 
(Gray, Lane and Varoudakis, 2007). If Tajikistan is to benefit from an expansion in 
the size of the budget to accommodate the priority expenditures of education, health 
and infrastructure maintenance, this must be accompanied by major improvements in 
the quality of governance. The key areas where governance must be improved include 
PFM, notably in the budget process, to enable a more rational and coherent allocation 
  31of scarce budget resources to be achieved, in the scope and quality of budget reporting 
and auditing, and in tax administration. Moreover, failure to restrain public borrowing 
and to implement reforms in the electricity sector would pose serious risks to fiscal 
sustainability and to the country’s prospects for economic growth and poverty 
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